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2I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of impracticability provides an affirmative 
defense to a complaint seeking specific performance or damages for 
an alleged breach of contract.  It may be interpreted as a default 
rule that provides an implied term in every contract excusing the 
parties from their obligations in the event that some unforeseen 
contingency causes their performances to become "impracticable."  
Although its precise meaning is unclear, the term "impracticable" 
connotes severe -- perhaps even catastrophic -- consequences.  In 
this respect, the doctrine is tantamount to an implied force 
majeure clause that applies whenever the impracticability is the 
result of circumstances that were in some sense unforeseen at the 
time the contract was formed.  Although the criteria for 
establishing whether the circumstances were "unforeseen" are also 
unclear, they subsume at the very least the idea that the 
circumstances were not explicitly provided for under the contract.
The impracticability doctrine evolved relatively recently out 
of the doctrines of impossibility and frustration of purpose.1
Indeed, until the middle of the nineteenth century the common law 
almost always required specific performance of contractual 
1For an overview of the evolution of the legal doctrine, see articles by Paul 
L. Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, The Uranium Market And The Westinghouse Case, 6 
J. Leg. Stud. 119 (1977), and Richard Posner & Andrew Rosenfield, Impossibility and 
Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. Leg. Stud. 83 (1977).
3obligations.  The doctrine the courts most commonly applied was the 
"rule of absolute liability."  This rule was relaxed, however, in 
Taylor v. Caldwell,2 which excused both parties from their 
performances when the music hall one had contracted to rent from 
the other was destroyed by a fire, thus establishing the doctrine 
of impossibility.  The doctrine of frustration was established in 
Krell v. Henry,3 a case in which a party was excused from paying 
for a room it had contracted to rent to view King Edward VII's 
coronation when the coronation parade was cancelled due to the 
King's illness.  This case, and others collectively referred to as 
the "Coronation Cases,"4 expanded the range of circumstances under 
which the common law would excuse performances beyond those which 
made them physically impossible.
Although all of these cases were English, both doctrines were 
subsequently adopted by American courts.  Indeed, modern statements 
of both doctrines have been written into the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts.5  A number of American cases have, however, further 
2Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (1863).
3Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740.
4See Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract 
Remedies, 43 Hastings Law J. 1, 22-23 (1991).
5See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, sections 263 and 265.
4expanded the range of circumstances in which contractual 
performances may be excused.  In Mineral Park,6 for instance, the 
defendants were excused on the grounds that their performances were 
"impracticable."  Mineral Park and similar cases thus established 
the doctrine of impracticability.  The Restatement (Second) now 
devotes more attention to this doctrine than to either 
impossibility or frustration of purpose, and the Uniform Commercial 
Code (U.C.C.) has made it the principal excuse doctrine for sales 
contracts.  The trend in the black letter law, at least, has 
clearly been in the direction of expanding the grounds on which 
excuse will be granted.
It is not at all clear, however, that this has been the trend 
in the case law.  Cases such as Mineral Park have not been widely 
followed.  Indeed, the courts' apparent reluctance to grant excuse 
despite the clear indications in both the Restatement (Second) and 
the U.C.C. that they may do so remains a conundrum.  As a number of 
scholars have noted,7 the inconsistencies in the case law merely 
reflect the confusion and disagreement among the courts about the 
appropriate role to assign to the excuse doctrines.  Nonetheless, 
6Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916).
7See Posner & Rosenfield, supra; Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in 
Long-Term Contracts, 75 Cal. Law Rev. 2005 (1987); Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial 
Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term Contracts, 69 Minn. Law Rev. 521 (1985).
5the courts have generally resolved any ambiguities inherent in the 
doctrines by construing them narrowly against the parties that have 
attempted to use them.8
The inconsistencies in the case law have been reflected in the 
commentary of legal scholars.  Whereas an early study of excuse 
doctrines by Posner and Rosenfield purported to show that "...the 
common law has an internal economic logic stronger than many legal 
scholars believe...,"9 some more recent studies have questioned 
whether they may have any useful role at all.10  As George Triantis 
put it, "The continued existence of the doctrine [of 
impracticability], even if substantially dormant, only serves to 
preserve the confusion and uncertainty as to its application and 
scope.  The role of contract law should be limited to the 
interpretation and enforcement of the parties' risk allocations."11
The conclusions of scholarly studies are, of course, always 
8Gillette, supra note 7, at 523.
9Posner and Rosenfield, supra note 1, at 118.
10See, for instance, Gillette, supra note 7; Scott, supra note 7; Alan O. Sykes, 
The Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability in a Second-Best World, J. Leg. Stud. 43 
(1990); George G. Triantis, Contractual Allocations Of Unknown Risks: A Critique Of 
The Doctrine Of Commercial Impracticability, 42 Univ. of Tor. Law J. 450 (1992).
11Triantis, supra note 10, at 483.
6contingent on their own particular theoretical perspectives and 
assumptions.  Some studies of the excuse doctrines, for instance, 
have principally investigated how they might affect the efficiency 
of contractual risk allocations.12  These have tended to conclude 
that excuse doctrines should have a very limited role.  A number of 
more recent studies, on the other hand, have attempted to assess 
whether the excuse doctrines may serve a more useful role in the 
context of relational contracts.  In these contexts the parties may 
have a duty to adjust their agreements as they unfold.13  Indeed, 
many scholars now recognize that the field of relational 
contracting is itself of sufficient importance to merit much 
further study.14
This essay offers a further analysis of excuse doctrines in a 
relational contracting context.  It focuses on the doctrine of 
impracticability, in part because this has been the most 
controversial of the excuse doctrines, and in part because the 
technical distinctions between the various excuse doctrines are of 
12This is clearly a strong focus of some of the studies already cited, such as 
Posner and Rosenfield, supra note 1, and Triantis, supra note 10.
13See, for instance, Gillette, supra note 7; Scott, supra note 7.
14For recent studies that promote the importance of relational contracting, see 
Scott, supra note 7; Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts In The Courts: An Analysis Of 
Incomplete Agreements And Judicial Strategies, 21 J. Leg. Stud. 271 (1992).
7relatively little practical importance for analytical purposes.15
To establish the groundwork for the analysis, the essay provides a 
behavioral economics framework within which both relational 
contracting practices and the doctrine of impracticability may be 
given concrete analytic form.  The framework joins the new 
institutional approach to economics, particularly as it has been 
developed by Oliver Williamson,16 with the game-theoretic approach 
to relational contracting suggested by Scott.17
This essay thus lies at the confluence of two related streams 
of scholarly research.  The confluence of these two streams is 
hardly surprising.  The concept of a relational contract emerged in 
response to the real-world limitations of classical contract 
analysis.18  And the new institutional approach to economics emerged 
in response to the real-world limitations of neoclassical 
economics.  It is no mere coincidence that classical contract 
15See Posner and Rosenfield, supra note 1, at 84-86.
16Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of 
Contractual Relations, 22 J. Law & Econ. 233 (1979); see also Oliver E. Williamson, 
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, (1985).
17Scott, supra note 7.
18See Goetz and Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Virginia Law Rev. 
1089, 1089-1091 (1981).
8analysis and neoclassical economics both conceive of transactions 
as complete contingent claims contracts.19  Nor is it surprising 
that the study of relational contracts and new institutional 
economics have common origins in empirical observations of real-
world business behavior.20  What is surprising, however, is that, 
given their cognate origins and common concerns, the connections 
between the two have not been given more attention.
Relational Contracting
A relational contract21 may be defined as an agreement of an 
ongoing nature between two or more parties which is typically 
19Goetz and Scott, supra note 18; Williamson, supra note 16.
20In particular, Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A 
Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Sociological Rev. 55 (1963).
21Until very recently, the term "relational contract" was used primarily by 
legal scholars.  Economists usually referred to such agreements more generally using 
the terms "long-term contract" or "incomplete contract."  This no doubt reflected a 
difference in the focus of most of the economic scholarship, which tended to emphasize 
the initial contracting stage of an agreement and its incentive effects rather than 
any subsequent adaptations.  The focus of the economics literature has recently begun 
to emphasize the subsequent adaptations, however, and economists are increasingly 
using the term “relational contract”.  See Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolph Richter, 
Institutions and Economic Theory, (1997), and Robert Gibbons, Incentives in 
Organizations, 12 J. Econ. Persp. 115 (1998) for surveys of the economics literature.
9adapted to changing circumstances and unique situations as they 
arise.  In contrast to the complete contingent claims contracts of 
classical contract analysis and neoclassical economics, a 
relational contract is incomplete because "...the parties are 
incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-
defined obligations."22  Although the parties usually sign a formal 
written instrument, they do so with the understanding that the 
terms of the agreement will be adapted as the transaction unfolds. 
The written instrument itself provides only a framework within with 
such adaptations may occur.  Indeed, MacNeil suggests that the 
written instrument may be thought of as more like a constitution 
for the administration of the agreement than a contract in the 
classical sense of the term.23
A relational contract is therefore neither as clearly and 
completely defined or as formal and impersonal as the complete 
contingent claims contracts of neoclassical economics and classical 
contract theory.  Indeed, if all the possible means of facilitating 
a transaction were arrayed along a continuum identifying the degree 
22Goetz and Scott, supra note 18, at 1091.
23Ian R. MacNeil, Contracts: Adjustment Of Long-Term Economic Relations Under 
Classical, Neoclassical, And Relational Contract Law 72 Northwestern Univ. Law Rev. 
854, 894 (1978).  MacNeil does, however, also suggest that there are dangers in 
pushing this metaphor too far.
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to which the transaction is internalized within some administrative 
hierarchy, with a classical contract at one end of the continuum 
and the complete bureaucratic internalization of the transaction at 
the other, a relational contract would lie somewhere in the 
middle.24  Relational contracts thus help to sustain "hybrid" modes 
of economic organization -- those that lie somewhere in between
arms-length market transactions and transactions conducted under 
the command and routine of formal organizations.25  In fact, they 
may be characterized to some degree in terms of the fiduciary 
responsibilities more commonly associated with a partnership than a 
contract in the usual sense.26
In addition to being an important legal device, therefore, 
relational contracts are also an important economic phenomenon.  
Economists have long recognized the importance and vast scope of 
the economic activities that are coordinated inside formal 
hierarchies rather than through market transactions, but they have 
only relatively recently begun to acknowledge the importance of the 
many economic activities that are coordinated through hybrid modes 
of organization, such as those that involve relational contracts.  
24This visualization was first suggested by Williamson, although he applied it 
to somewhat different concepts.  See Williamson, supra note 16.
25Id.
26Gillette, supra note 7, at 571.
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The new institutional economics, particularly as it has been 
developed by Williamson, has clearly been at the forefront of 
emerging new lines of research on nonmarket modes of economic 
organization.
The new institutional economics traces its origins to Ronald 
Coase's famous paper on the theory of the firm.27  This was the 
first significant attempt by an economist to explain the role of 
the business firm in an otherwise market-oriented, capitalist 
economy.  The paper conceived of modes of economic organization, 
however, in terms of a simple dichotomy -- all modes of 
organization could be categorized as either "market" or "firm."  
Since that paper, the lines have come to seem not only less clear, 
but even somewhat arbitrary.  Research by noneconomists, including 
legal scholars developing the field of relational contract law, has 
been particularly influential.
Early theoretical work on relational contracting was also 
strongly influenced by important empirical research in sociology, 
27Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937).  This is the 
"other" paper for which Coase is rightly famous.  Although it has had less impact on 
legal scholarship than the paper in which Coase presented his famous theorem, it has 
been very influential on the economics literature.  See the symposium, Conference 
Papers to Celebrate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the "Nature of the Firm" 4 J. Law, 
Econ. & Org. 1 (1988) for a broad survey of its impact.  
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particularly studies by Stewart Macaulay.28  Macaulay’s systematic 
surveys of real-world business behavior revealed that many market 
transactions were much less formal and much more fluid than either 
economic theory or the theory of contracts seemed to acknowledge.  
Subsequently, legal scholars began devising new avenues for legal 
theory which recognized important distinctions between different 
types of market transactions.29  And economists working in the 
Coasian tradition30 -- particularly Williamson -- began to develop 
new approaches to economics which could account for the rich 
diversity of nonmarket as well as market institutions.
The interdisciplinary character of so much of the research has 
28Macaulay, supra note 20.
29Notable early articles include Ian MacNeil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. 
Cal. Law Rev. 691 (1974(; MacNeil, supra note 23; Goetz and Scott, supra note 7.
30One could debate who should be included in this group, but most economists 
would probably agree that it should include transaction cost theorists such as Oliver 
Williamson, Michael Wachter & John Harris, Understanding the Employment Relation: The 
Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 Bell J. of Econ. 250 (1975), Victor Goldberg, 
Toward an Expanded Economic Theory of Contract, 10 J. Econ. Issues 45 (1976), Benjamin 
Klein, Michael Crawford, and Armen Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, 
and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. Law & Econ. 297 (1978), and Williamson, 
supra note 16, as well as agency theorists such as Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976),and Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and 
Observability, 10 Bell J. of Econ. 74 (1979).
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made it an especially interesting -- and remarkably fertile -- area 
of scholarship.  Most of the law and economics literature is 
interdisciplinary only in the sense that it applies concepts and 
techniques from economics to the analysis of the law and legal 
institutions.31  The economics profession has generally treated the 
law only as a source of problems to which its concepts and 
techniques might be applied, and law and economics scholars within 
the legal profession have usually been content to follow their 
direction.  In their efforts to understand nonmarket modes of 
economic organization, however, some economists have actually 
looked to the law and legal scholarship for insight and 
inspiration, and not just applications for their techniques.32
Regardless of their disciplinary perspective, most scholars 
would probably agree that both the practice and the theory of 
relational contracting are still in their infancy.  There are still 
many issues for scholars to explore, and relational contracting 
practices themselves will probably continue to evolve.  It is thus 
31Indeed, the unofficial dean of the law and economics movement -- Judge Posner 
-- has argued that this is the only appropriate direction of influence.  In his view, 
legal scholarship has little to offer to economic theory.  See Richard A. Posner, 
Overcoming Law, 440 (1995).
32For an acknowledgement by Williamson of his use of the law and legal 
scholarship, see Oliver E. Williamson, Revisiting Legal Realism: The Law, Economics, 
and Organization Perspective 5 Ind. and Corp. Change 383 (1996).
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not yet clear whether relational contracting will require the 
development of special legal doctrines.  Indeed, the role of 
traditional legal doctrines in the performance of relational 
contracts is still not well understood.33  But since hybrid modes of 
economic organization may be more important than many scholars have 
previously acknowledged, and since they may grow in importance yet, 
an understanding of this role is well worth pursuing.
Outline of the Essay
This essay attempts to construct an analytical framework 
within which relational contracting practices may be understood, 
and uses it to derive normative conclusions about the doctrine of 
impracticability.  The broader contours of the framework are 
provided by concepts from the literature on behavioral economics 
and new institutional economics, and the details are filled in 
using a simple game-theoretic conception of cooperation which 
elaborates on the game-theoretic approach to relational contracting 
suggested by Scott.34
In contrast to neoclassical economics, and most classical 
contract analysis as well, both new institutional economics and the 
legal scholarship on relational contracts commonly assume that 
33Scott, supra note 7, at 2012.
34Id.
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economic agents' rationality is bounded -- that is, that there are 
limits on agents' capacities to frame and solve economic problems. 
Many of the writers who have addressed the doctrine of 
impracticability have also either explicitly or implicitly assumed 
that agents' rationality is bounded.  Indeed, one might argue that 
the doctrine of impracticability itself presumes that agents' 
rationality is bounded.  It should come as no surprise, therefore, 
that the bounded rationality assumption is also a central premise 
of this essay.35  As this assumption is still controversial, section 
II explains why it is necessary, and introduces some concepts and 
terminology that will be helpful in formulating a theoretical 
framework that is explicitly and self-consciously based on bounded 
rationality assumptions.   
Section III presents the theoretical framework and discusses 
its implications.  Whereas many previous studies have concluded 
that there is little, if any, useful role for the doctrine of 
impracticability, the analysis here suggests that, if it can be 
35In this respect, the essay attempts to respond to the challenge issued by 
other legal scholars to incorporate human frailties and cognitive limitations 
explicitly into law and economics scholarship.  See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing 
Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and 
Economics, 65 Chi-Kent. L. Rev. 23 (1989); Russell B. Korobkin and Thomas S. 
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law 
and Economics, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 1051 (2000).  
16
wisely applied, the doctrine should help to reduce the costs of 
governing relational contracts and provide a myriad of other 
economic benefits.  One of the main implications of the theoretical 
framework is that the parties to a relational contract may have to 
incur significant governance costs in order to ensure that their 
agreement will be sustainable.  These governance costs arise from 
their need either to restrain their levels of cooperation and the 
size of their investments or to invest in special arbitration 
procedures in order to lessen the strategic uncertainties inherent 
in their agreement.  If the doctrine of impracticability can be 
wisely applied, it may help to reduce these strategic uncertainties 
and thus increase the parties' levels of cooperation and the size 
of their investments without the use of costly arbitration 
procedures.   
Section IV elaborates on these normative implications and 
attempts to define criteria by which the doctrine of 
impracticability should be applied.  The criteria that it suggests 
are broadly consistent with at least some of the precedents.  They 
are also consistent with the admonishments of those scholars who 
have worried that expansive interpretations of the excuse doctrines 
would dampen parties' incentives to allocate contractual risks 
efficiently.  Section V addresses whether the normative 
prescriptions might conflict with any of the broader moral values 
embedded in contract law, such as the principles of party autonomy 
17
and individual self-expression, and assesses whether legal 
intervention of the kind they support would undermine the moral and 
ethical basis of any extralegal governance mechanisms that might 
also be important to sustaining a relational contract.  Section VI 
offers some conclusions.
II. BOUNDED RATIONALITY
The term "bounded rationality" refers to a conception of human 
beings' cognitive abilities that recognizes limitations on the 
human imagination and humans' information processing capacities.  
It implies that human behavior may be characterized as 
"intentionally rational, but only limitedly so."36  Although the 
bounded rationality assumption remains controversial, serious 
controversy arises only from its use in economic models, not from 
any disagreement about its descriptive relevance.  It is simply 
indisputable that human rationality is bounded.  If it were not, no 
one would ever experience true surprise, and a game of chess would 
be no more challenging than a game of tic-tac-toe.  The important 
issue is whether the bounded rationality assumption is necessary --
or even helpful -- for constructing useful economic models and 
conducting insightful analyses of legal doctrines.  
36This is a famous quote from Herbert Simon, who won the Nobel Prize in 
economics in 1985 for his seminal work on bounded rationality.  See Herbert A. Simon, 
Models of Man (1957).
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Those who believe it is not usually adhere to a logical 
positivist philosophy of science, and often cite Milton Friedman's 
famous paper37 on the methodology of positive economics in support 
of their position.  Friedman's point in that paper was to emphasize 
that a model need not be descriptively accurate to provide useful 
predictions.  It would do an injustice to Friedman's paper, 
however, and to Friedman himself, to push that point too far. 
Friedman’s argument does not imply that the assumptions of a model 
are completely irrelevant, or that it is illegitimate to model 
peoples' behavior as less than perfectly rational.  In fact, even 
some of Friedman's critics acknowledge that he never intended to 
embrace an inflexible logical positivist philosophy of science.38
Rather, his argument was a counter to critiques of neoclassical 
economics which denied the relevance even of models which imputed 
rather modest cognitive abilities to their agents.
Most of the models used by conventional economic theorists 
today impute considerably more rationality to their agents than the 
37Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in Essays in Positive 
Economics (1953).
38McCloskey, for instance, notes that Friedman's essay was "more post-modernist 
than one might suppose" and that "Friedman appeared to be struggling to escape the 
grip of positivism and its intellectual traditions, though with only sporadic 
success."  See D.N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics, 21 J. Econ. Lit. 481, 485-
486 (1983).
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relatively simple, static optimization models defended by Friedman. 
Modern theorists commonly assume that economic agents are able to 
solve infinite horizon inter-temporal optimization problems with 
imperfect information using Bayesian priors and complex signaling 
arrangements.  Most noneconomists cannot even comprehend what that 
means.  There is a growing sentiment even within the economics 
profession, however, that many of these models impute far too much 
rationality to their agents, and that some conception of behavior 
that is boundedly rational would yield significant advances in 
economic theory.39
Indeed, a casual survey of the economics journals suggests 
that there has never been any time in which the interest within the 
economics profession in models based on bounded rationality 
assumptions has been greater than in the present.  And although 
they might still believe that formal treatments are premature, a 
number of leading economists have now attested to the desirability 
of bounded rationality assumptions.40  Even Gary Becker, who has 
39See, for instance, the argument by John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 
J. Econ. Lit. 669 (1996).
40For a good survey of recent work in economics that uses the bounded 
rationality assumption, see Conlisk, supra note 39.  A list of the prominent 
economists who have expressed an interest in or indicated a receptiveness to models 
based on bounded rationality assumptions would have to include a number of Nobel prize 
winners, including Herbert Simon, of course, and also Kenneth Arrow, James Buchanan, 
Ronald Coase, Douglas North, and perhaps even Gary Becker.  These have been among the 
20
pushed the perfect rationality assumption farther than almost 
anyone else, has acknowledged in his Nobel lecture that "Actions 
are constrained by income, time, imperfect memory and calculating 
capacities, and other limited resources,"41 [italics added] and that 
he may at times have imputed too much rationality to people in his 
own work.42
Bounded Rationality and the Doctrine of Impracticability
Regardless of whether it has any widespread acceptance within 
the economics profession, any serious treatment of the doctrine of 
impracticability will require that bounded rationality be made 
integral to the analysis.43  There are two prongs to the modern 
doctrine of impracticability.  The first is the impracticability 
test: in order for the doctrine to apply, performance of the 
contract would have to result in a severe loss for the party 
seeking an excuse.  The second is the foreseeability test: 
performance must have been made impracticable by an occurrence 
most influential economists on the law and economics movement. 
41Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J. 
Pol. Econ. 385, 386 (1993).
42Id. at 402.
43This is a position that has been supported by a number of legal scholars, 
including Joskow, supra note 1; Triantis, supra note 10; Gillette, supra note 7.
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which was unforeseen at the time of contracting.  Although it does 
not appear to receive equal billing, the foreseeability test is by 
no means less important than impracticability.  As Triantis 
explains, "The doctrine necessarily rests on the premise that 
contracting parties ... are unable to allocate contractually risks 
that are unforeseen."44 [italics added]
Consider the language of U.C.C. section 2-615(a), which 
embodies the most contemporary version of the doctrine:  "Delay in 
delivery or non-delivery ... by a seller who complies with 
paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty ... if 
performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence 
of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption 
on which the contract was made..." [italics added].  Vague though 
it may be, it is possible to interpret this language as alluding to 
contingencies that are unforeseeable owing to the limits on the 
rationality of the parties to the contract.  Indeed, such an 
interpretation is supported by official comment 1, which explains 
that "This section excuses a seller ... where his performance has 
become commercially impracticable because of unforeseen supervening 
circumstances not within the contemplation of the parties at the 
time of contracting" [italics added]. 
In a world where everyone was unboundedly rational, it is 
44Triantis, supra note 10.
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difficult to imagine why any "unforeseen supervening circumstances" 
that were not "within the contemplation of the parties at the time 
of contracting" would ever arise, particularly if they were 
potentially important enough to render the performance of the 
contract impracticable.  One could, of course, argue that the high 
costs of transacting might make it uneconomical for the parties to 
address all contingencies in a detailed contract, but this does not 
explain why the circumstances should be characterized as 
"unforeseen" and "not within the contemplation of the parties at 
the time of contracting."  The explanation that is most compatible 
with this essay, of course, is that both the courts and the 
drafters of the U.C.C. have correctly perceived that the parties to 
a contract are boundedly rational45 and that they will not always be 
able to contemplate all of the contingencies that might arise 
during the life of their agreement, even if those contingencies 
might be important enough to render their performance of the 
contract impracticable.  
There are two very different ways in which bounds on agents' 
rationality could explain unforeseen contingencies.  Since 
boundedly rational agents are prone to make errors, unforeseen 
contingencies could arise from the failure of the parties to 
contemplate contingencies that should have been foreseeable based 
45That is not to say, of course, that they have ever thought about peoples’ 
cognitive limitations in exactly those terms.
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on past experience, expert advice, or common sense.  Although the 
legal precedents are not crystal clear, it seems doubtful whether 
unforeseen contingencies of this type should pass the 
foreseeability test.  If they did, the parties to a contract might
be excused from performances in situations which they could have 
avoided altogether.  As a number of scholars have noted,46 the 
doctrine of impracticability would hardly provide efficient 
incentives if that was the way it was applied.
Unforeseen contingencies could also arise, however, even if 
the parties drew wisely on their own and others' past experience, 
the best expert advice, and were otherwise eminently sensible.  In 
such a case, the contingencies would, in a sense, be reasonably 
unforeseen.  Indeed, as Posner and Rosenfield have observed,47 some 
courts have applied an objective version of the foreseeability test 
and stated it in exactly those terms.  As one California court put 
it,48
The purpose of a contract is to place the 
risks of performance upon the promisor, and 
the relation of the parties, terms of the 
contract, and circumstances surrounding its 
46See Joskow, supra note 1, at 158 for a clear statement of the argument.
47Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 1, at 99.
48Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 54. 153 P.2d 47, 50 (1944).
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formation must be examined to determine 
whether it can be fairly inferred that the 
risk of the event ... was not reasonably
foreseeable [italics added].
Under an objective version of the foreseeability test, the 
parties would assume the risks of any contingencies that were 
reasonably foreseeable.  This would appear to be more consistent 
with the official interpretations of the U.C.C. than any subjective 
version of the test.  As official comment 8 to U.C.C. section 2-615 
indicates "... the exemptions of this section do not apply when the 
contingency in question is sufficiently foreshadowed at the time of 
contracting to be included among the business risks which are 
fairly to be regarded as part of the dickered terms..." [italics 
added].  Thus interpreted, the foreseeability doctrine would 
provide a way of "delineating the boundary between those 
contingencies that are reasonably part of the decision-making 
process and those that are not."49
The modern doctrine of impracticability, therefore, is 
probably meant to be based on an objective foreseeability test.  
There is, nonetheless, considerable disagreement in the legal 
precedents, as well as in the commentary of legal scholars.50  The 
49Joskow, supra note 1, at 157.
50Joskow, supra note 1, at 157-158, for instance, seems to think that the courts 
would normally apply an objective test; Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 1, at 99-100, 
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normative analysis below attempts to show that, if it is to provide 
economically efficient incentives, the doctrine must involve the 
application of an objective foreseeability test.  Indeed, the 
analysis implies that there are governance costs associated with 
any ambiguities or judicial errors in the application of the 
doctrine.  This raises the issue of whether the courts can be 
relied upon to apply the doctrine clearly and consistently enough 
to reduce the costs of governing relational contracts overall, or 
whether their efforts will simply backfire and prove 
counterproductive.
Indeed, bounded rationality assumptions should not only 
characterize the parties to a relational contract, but also the 
judges and juries that must interpret and apply any relevant legal 
doctrines.51  If it is to be clearly and consistently applied, the 
doctrine of impracticability must be within the scope of the 
decision-making capabilities of the courts.  The issue is whether 
criteria may be defined that are consistent with the purpose and 
character of a relational contract, as well as the boundedly 
rational behavior of the parties, and yet clear enough that they 
on the other hand, seem to believe the foreseeability test is actually disappearing.
51The general matter of judicial competence is beyond the scope of this essay.  
See Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence And The Interpretation of Incomplete 
Contracts, 23 J. Leg. Stud. 159 (1994) for an interesting survey of the relevant 
literature.
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may be consistently applied by the courts given the existing rules 
of evidence and the limited competencies of judges and juries.  
Routines and Heuristics
The focus of this essay is on long-term contractual agreements 
between relatively sophisticated business parties.  Thus, the 
business firm is the basic unit of analysis.  Although it is not 
necessarily inconsistent with bounded rationality assumptions, the 
conceptualization of firm behavior in neoclassical economics 
clearly highlights the sense in which it is rational at the expense 
of comprehending how that rationality is bounded.  The issue is 
whether there is any practical alternative.  While at one time 
there may not have been, that is no longer true.  A diverse set of 
scholars working within related but distinct fields of inquiry, 
including behavioral economics, decision theory, evolutionary 
economics, the management of technology, and managerial and 
organizational theory, have developed an alternative 
conceptualization which characterizes firms’ behavior in terms of 
their behavioral routines and decision-making heuristics.52
52A number of legal scholars have already drawn on this conceptualization in 
their own research, though perhaps without embracing the research agenda that 
accompanies it.  See, for instance, Scott, supra note 7, Triantis, supra note 10.  For 
an excellent overview of the literature and discussion of the basic approach, see 
Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change 
(1982).  For a discussion of the research agenda, see Michael D. Cohen et al., 
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There is considerably more flexibility inherent in this 
conceptualization of firm behavior than one might at first imagine. 
As Nelson and Winter point out, a firm's behavior may be 
represented by a hierarchy of routines and heuristics, describing 
1) its day-to-day operations, 2) its periodic investment decisions, 
and 3) at the highest level, its major strategic decisions, such as 
whether and how to modify its day-to-day operations or which new 
business opportunities to pursue.53  Although many investment and 
strategic decisions are far from routine in the ordinary sense of 
the word, the behavioral theory of the firm assumes they may 
nonetheless be described by those "...relatively constant 
dispositions and strategic heuristics..."54 that define what is 
"...regular and predictable..."55 about them.  
The use of the word "routines" to describe a firm's operations 
Routines and Other Recurring Action Patterns of Organizations: Contemporary Research 
Issues, 5 Ind. and Corp. Change 653 (1996).  For an update on recent developments, see 
Special Issue: Theory of the Firm, Learning and Organization, 12 Ind. and Corp. Change 
147 (2003).  As a survey of the literature will make clear, the treatment of routines 
and heuristics here does scant justice to the subtleties and complexities of the 
research issues.




is not meant to suggest that they are simple or banal, either.  
Rather, it reflects the view that many of the complex patterns of 
activities that comprise a firm's operations are intentionally 
repeated from one period to the next.  Indeed, a firm's success may 
well depend on how effectively it is able to repeat complex 
patterns of activities over time -- or, in other words, on how well 
it is able to “routinize” its operations.56  In this respect, the 
routinization of a firm's operations may describe an actual 
management goal, and not just a theoretical conception of the 
firm's behavior.
The use of routines and heuristics to conceptualize firm 
behavior is not necessarily as pronounced a departure from the 
conventional economic approach as it may appear.  The routines and 
heuristics that define a firm's behavior might be usefully 
represented as the solution to some constrained optimization 
problem.  Indeed, one might argue that the constrained optimization 
techniques characteristic of the conventional economic approach are 
themselves simply part of the routines of conventional economic 
analysis.  On this view, they merely serve to help identify and 
clarify the routines and heuristics that define a firm's behavior. 
Indeed, this is the way in which many economists rationalize 
their use of constrained optimization models.  Such models are 
56Nelson & Winter discuss routines as a target of the management goals of 
control, replication and imitation.  See Id. at 112-124.
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simply too vulnerable to a reductio ad absurdum argument not to be 
interpreted in some metaphorical sense.  Unless they are willing to 
contend that the entire course of human history, down to its 
minutest details, can be represented as some refinement of a 
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium path of some imperfect information, 
infinite-horizon, overlapping generations model, even those 
economists working strictly within the conventional paradigm will 
acknowledge that the logic of optimization can be pushed only so 
far.  Indeed, if constrained optimization techniques are used 
heuristically, they may be fully consistent with bounded 
rationality assumptions.57  The important criterion is whether the 
scope and complexity of the problem the agents in a model are 
assumed to solve is within the range of their cognitive abilities.
There are three main reasons why this essay conceptualizes 
firm behavior in terms of routines and heuristics rather than a 
constrained optimization problem.  First of all, the analysis is 
mainly directed at relational contracts between corporate entities. 
A corporation's decision-making capabilities are embodied in 
57This does not mean that the bounded rationality assumptions are meaningless or 
unnecessary.  It merely means to suggest that constrained optimization techniques may 
be used heuristically to bring boundedly rational behavior into a sharper focus.  
Attempts to interpret bounded rationality assumptions as merely calling for models in 
which agents' behavior is characterized by optimizations subject to their cognitive 
limitations (see Posner, supra note 31) are logically incoherent.  See Conlisk, supra
note 39 for a discussion of the infinite regress problem.
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distinct corporate assets -- eg) "human" and "organizational" 
capital, computer programs, corporate records, etc.  It is more 
realistic to conceive of a corporation’s capabilities and behavior 
in terms of its routines and heuristics than in terms of a 
constrained optimization problem.  Second, since the analysis is 
predicated on bounded rationality assumptions, the nuances cannot 
be articulated as clearly or completely in terms of the 
conventional logic.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
conceptualizing firm behavior in terms of corporate routines and 
heuristics makes the bounded rationality assumptions more 
conspicuous and integral to the analysis.  
The Use of Routines and Heuristics in Modelling Relational 
Contracting Problems
For the purposes of this essay, relational contracting 
problems will be separated into two phases: 1) the first phase, in 
which each of the parties decides whether to enter into a 
relational contract and negotiates its terms and conditions, and 2) 
the second phase, in which the parties transact within the 
parameters of a relational contract they have already entered into. 
In the first phase of relational contracting problems, the parties 
must compare the expected net gains from a relational contract with 
the expected net gains that could be earned from any of the 
alternatives, based, of course, on some understanding of how the 
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relational contract and the alternatives would actually work.  
The parties' interactions within the second phase of a 
relational contracting problem will generally consist of a variety 
of coordinated activities and cooperative adjustments, as required 
by the circumstances at hand.  These coordinated activities and 
cooperative adjustments will be conceptualized as the day-to-day 
routines characteristic of the transaction.  Although the ordinary 
meaning of the term "routine" may not do justice to the 
difficulties of actually coordinating the parties' activities and 
negotiating cooperative adjustments, such coordination and 
adjustment is nonetheless "routine" in the special sense used here. 
In the event of some unforeseen contingency, of course, the 
routines governing the parties' conduct might fail, thereby causing 
a fracture of the agreement.
The first phase of a relational contracting problem will be 
conceptualized in two related ways.  The analysis will assume that 
at the highest level in a firm's decision hierarchy, the level at 
which the firm contemplates decisions with the broadest strategic 
scope, the party's decision-making heuristics may be described 
using Williamson's conjectures about the assignment of transactions 
to governance structures.58  In Williamson's schema, a party first 
forms some expectation about how well a governance structure would 
58Williamson, supra note 16.
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work, and then makes some assessment of how high the governance 
costs would be.  The party will choose to enter into a relational 
contract only if the governance costs would thus be lower than they 
would be if any alternative means of organizing the transaction 
were chosen (the next best alternative would usually be to organize 
the transaction internally within the firm’s administrative 
hierarchy).  
III. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A firm's decision to enter into a relational contract is made 
at the highest level in its decision hierarchy.59  Generally, a 
profit-seeking firm will only enter into a relational contract if 
it determines that 1) the transaction will yield sufficient net 
returns, and 2) the governance costs of transacting through a 
relational contract will be less than those that would be incurred 
in sustaining the transaction by any other means.  The analysis 
will assume throughout that a relational contract would yield 
sufficient net returns to make the transaction at issue worthwhile. 
Williamson conjectures that the costs of governing a 
transaction depend on four factors: 1) the size of any transaction-
specific investments, 2) the uncertainty inherent in the 
59See Gordon Walker & David Weber, A Transaction Cost Approach to Make-or-Buy 
Decisions, 29 Admin. Sc. Quar. 373, 381-383 (1984) for a discussion of the make-or-buy 
decision making process of a large automobile manufacturer.
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transaction environment, 3) whether the transaction will be 
repeated, and, most significantly, 4) the manner in which the 
transaction is governed.60  For the purposes of this essay, a 
relational contract may be considered one possible manner of 
governing a transaction.  Internal organization within the firm’s 
administrative hierarchy may be considered another.61  Williamson 
reasons that the manner of governing a transaction with the lowest 
costs will vary depending upon the other three factors.  He 
suggests a schema for assigning transactions to the governance 
structures with the lowest governance costs.
In Williamson's schema, a relational contract would only be 
considered for a transaction that 1) required significant 
transaction-specific investments, 2) had to be conducted in the 
face of significant uncertainty, and 3) would be of an on-going, 
long-term character.  The principal alternative to a relational 
contract would be to organize the transaction internally, either 
through a merger of the parties, a joint venture of some kind, or 
by one of the parties investing in the capabilities necessary to do 
itself whatever it was that would have been contracted for at arms 
length.  For a transaction of an on-going, long-term character, 
60Williamson, supra note 16.
61Williamson conceives of the manner in which transactions are governed more 
broadly than in the narrow, legalistic sense assumed here.  The purpose of the 
legalistic focus here is simply to highlight the analysis of legal doctrine.
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Williamson's conjectures about the choice between these two 
alternatives imply the following:
                                  Uncertainty            
                        moderate                  high         
 
 Internal Organization/  Internal Organization 
          large Relational Contract     
Specific         
Investments     
 Relational Contract     Internal Organization/




The relative costs of governing a transaction through an arms-
length, relational contract rise as 1) the size of transaction-
specific investments rises, and 2) the degree of uncertainty rises. 
Thus, on-going transactions requiring large, transaction-specific 
investments in highly uncertain environments will generally be 
internalized.  On the other hand, on-going transactions that 
require only small or moderate transaction-specific investments in 
only moderately uncertain environments will generally be governed 
through relational contracts.  On-going transactions requiring 
large transaction-specific investments in moderately uncertain 
environments and those requiring only small or moderate 
transaction-specific investments in highly uncertain environments 
might best be governed through internal organization or relational 
contracts, depending on the particulars of each case.
As simple as it may sound, Williamson's schema has been 
elaborated and applied with great success in a number of empirical 
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studies.62  It has been extremely influential on the research 
undertaken by formal economic theorists as well as business 
scholars who study management and organizations.63  Indeed, it is 
frequently taught, though perhaps in some distilled form, in a 
number of MBA programs.  For all of these reasons, it is a useful 
way of representing the heuristics that firms employ in deciding 
how to organize their transactions.
Williamson's rationalization of his schema relies on the 
assumption that economic agents are inevitably characterized by 
both bounded rationality and opportunism.64  Because they are 
boundedly rational, the parties must leave larger gaps in a 
relational contract as the environment becomes more uncertain.  
This places a greater onus on subsequent adaptations of the 
agreement.  The likelihood that one of the parties will behave 
opportunistically, however, and refuse to cooperate in adapting the 
agreement will also rise as the degree of uncertainty rises.  A 
cloud thus hangs over the transaction, growing larger as the 
62See Howard A. Shelanski & Peter G. Klein, Empirical Research in Transaction 
Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11 J. Law & Econ. & Org. 335 (1995).
63The influence of Williamson's transaction cost approach is particularly 
evident in Alfred Chandler's monumental comparative history of the modern business 
corporation.  See Alfred Chandler, Scale and Scope, (1990).
64Williamson, supra note 16.
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environment becomes more uncertain.  At some point, one of the 
parties will prefer to organize the transaction internally, so as 
to eliminate the risk of disruptions and other inefficiencies 
caused by the possibility of the other's opportunism.
While this logic is intuitively compelling, it has resisted 
theoretical formalizations.  Many formal economic theorists have 
taken up Williamson's challenge to investigate transactional 
problems, but they have usually proceeded by elaborating on 
information asymmetries or investment disincentives, rather than on 
governance problems as Williamson has more broadly conceived of 
them.65  The bounded rationality assumption has no doubt posed a 
considerable impediment.  While a fully satisfying formal treatment 
of governance problems is probably beyond the reach of existing 
techniques, heuristic models may nonetheless prove insightful.  
Some simple game-theoretic reasoning will be used, therefore, to 
help conceptualize the link between uncertainty and the governance 
costs of a relational contract.  This link is well worth clarifying 
because it will prove central to the analysis of the role the 
doctrine of impracticability may have in helping to reduce those 
65See, for instance, Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and 
Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 
691 (1986); Oliver D. Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 
98 J. Pol. Econ. 1119 (1990); Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm in 
Handbook of Industrial Organization (1987).
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governance costs.  
Some Game-Theoretic Heuristics
The discussion in this section is based on a simple, game-
theoretic model that has been presented more formally elsewhere.66
The model describes a scenario in which two parties -- or “players” 
-– must decide how much they will each invest for the sake of their 
transaction and then how much they will cooperate with one another 
during their subsequent and repeated interactions.  Their profits 
will be greater the larger their investments and the more 
cooperative their interactions.  Unfortunately, they both know that 
their transaction is prone to the prisoner’s dilemma: even if they 
agree to cooperate fully, each knows that the other will have an 
incentive to “cheat” by cooperating less than fully.  The cheater 
prospers by sharing in the profits without pulling its weight while 
the other -– the “dupe” –- suffers by having to pick up the slack.
The conventional wisdom holds that the players in a repeated 
prisoner’s dilemma game will normally be able to sustain a 
cooperative agreement by threatening to punish any player who 
66 See Donald J. Smythe, The Role of Contractual Enforcement and Excuse in the 
Governance of Relational Agreements: An Economic Analysis, Global Jurist Frontiers: 
Vol.2: No.2: Art.3 (http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol2/iss2/art3). For an 
excellent, nontechnical introduction to game theory, its history and its methods, see 
William Poundstone, Prisoner's Dilemma (1992).  For a technical introduction, see 
Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists (1992).
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deviates.  In the model that is described here, the threatened 
punishment would consist of the punishing party reverting to 
completely noncooperative behavior in every remaining period of the 
repeated game and thus causing the cheater to lose the benefits of 
its cooperation.  That would be a very severe threat of punishment, 
indeed.  But it would also be credible, since the party being 
punished would have an incentive to behave noncooperatively in 
every remaining period too, and the parties’ strategies would thus 
be in a noncooperative equilibrium.67
A relational contracting agreement could be sustained in this 
manner, however, only if the present discounted value of the losses 
the parties anticipated from the threatened punishment were at 
least as great as the short-term gains they could earn by cheating. 
The short-term gains would derive from the cheater’s temporary 
increase in profits until its cheating was detected and the 
punishment commenced.  The anticipated losses from the punishment 
would derive from the decrease in the future cooperativeness of the 
parties’ interactions.  Since the gains from cheating are earned 
immediately, but the losses are prospective, the difficulty in 
sustaining a cooperative agreement through punishment threats 
becomes greater as the rate at which the parties’ discount their 
future profits (and losses) rises.
67In game-theoretic terms, a cooperative equilibrium sustained by this 
threatened punishment would be “subgame perfect.”  See Gibbons, supra note 71.
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If the parties were unboundedly rational then they would be 
able to foresee all of the problematic circumstances and 
contingencies that might arise over the course of their agreement 
and agree on appropriate contractual safeguards.  But since the 
parties are boundedly rational there are inevitably some 
contingencies that they cannot foresee and for which they cannot 
plan.  Indeed, one of the great virtues of a relational contract is 
that it does not require complete and exhaustive planning for every 
possible contingency.  Rather, the parties can adapt their 
agreement to contingencies as they arise.  In this sense, a 
relational contract helps to shelter the parties from the 
uncertainties of unforeseen contingencies.  
There is another sense, however, in which a relational 
contract actually exposes the parties to uncertainties they would 
not otherwise face.  It is useful to distinguish between the 
fundamental uncertainties inherent in the possible states of the 
world and the strategic uncertainties inherent in a relational 
contract.  The former derive mainly from factors external to the 
parties' transaction, such as the weather, macroeconomic 
conditions, international conflicts, etc.  There is little the 
parties can do to avoid them.  The latter derive mainly from the 
nature of the parties' transaction itself.  Once the parties enter 
a relational contract each of their fortunes is tied in some 
measure to the behavior of the other.  If they could always be 
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relied upon to adapt their performances honestly and fairly in 
accordance with the broader principles of their agreement, then the 
fundamental uncertainties associated with the unforeseeable 
contingencies would not create any strategic uncertainties about 
the behavior of the other.
As Williamson has emphasized,68 however, the parties may well 
be expected to behave opportunistically.  For instance, in the 
event of an unforeseen contingency one of them might refuse to 
adapt the transaction, regardless of whether it had obliged itself 
to do so at the outset.  Since the parties' failure to adapt their 
agreement would be tantamount to a complete breakdown in their 
cooperation, the possibility would add to the uncertainty they 
faced going into the transaction.  Indeed, a significant part of 
the uncertainty faced by the parties to a relational contract may 
be of this strategic type.  And uncertainty of any kind causes the 
parties to discount their future profits (and losses) more heavily, 
thereby inhibiting the effectiveness of punishment threats in 
maintaining a self-enforcing relational agreement. 
Strategic Response
Since a relational contract is by design largely self-
enforcing, one important way in which the parties may respond to 
68Williamson, supra note 16.
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the uncertainties is by negotiating an agreement that is less than 
fully cooperative.  Under the usual game-theoretic assumptions,69
the parties’ incentives to deviate from a cooperative agreement 
decline as the cooperativeness of the agreement declines.  Thus, if 
the uncertainty inherent in the transaction environment is too 
great for the parties to be able to sustain a fully cooperative 
agreement, they may still be able to sustain an agreement that is 
less than fully cooperative.  Indeed, the implication is that they 
might want to negotiate an agreement that is less than fully 
cooperative to ensure that their agreement will be sustainable.
This is important because even a relatively small decrease in 
the cooperativeness of the parties’ agreement could have a 
significant effect on the profitability of their transaction.  In 
any one period a small decrease in the level of their cooperation 
might not matter all that much, but a small decrease in their 
cooperativeness in every period over the life of a long-term 
agreement probably would.  Moreover, the decrease in the 
cooperativeness of their transaction would usually be accompanied 
by a decrease in the size of any initial investments they might 
make towards the profitability of the agreement.  The overall 
69In particular, the assumption that the players’ payoff functions are 
concave in the strategic variables.  Game-theoretic models are usually only well-
defined under concavity assumptions.   
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effect could be very large. 
An Example
The idea can be made more concrete with an example.70  Suppose 
that a manufacturer would like to contract for the supply of 
certain component parts.  Suppose, however, that the industry is in 
flux so that any arms-length transaction will be fraught with 
uncertainty.  The manufacturer would like to enter into a 
relational contract with a supplier so that they can adapt their 
agreement to both foreseen and unforeseen contingencies as they 
arise.  It finds a supplier and they begin their negotiations.  
Both parties know that their relationship will be more profitable 
if they can sustain high levels of cooperation.  The manufacturer, 
for instance, may be operating under "just in time" principles.  
Hence, it may have to depend on timely deliveries.  The supplier 
may produce a number of different components for a number of 
70There is, of course, a catch.  The concept of a relational contract is 
predicated on the notion that the parties are unable to specify all of their 
contractual obligations in a written document.  Thus, many of the cooperative 
adjustments that they expect to make under their agreement are not fully and clearly 
defined in advance.  An example may help to clarify what these cooperative adjustments 
might entail, but the more clearly it does so, the more it will seem that the parties 
should have been able to specify them in a written instrument.  The example here 
should thus be read more for the concreteness it lends to the problem than for any 
insight it provides into the solution.
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different manufacturers using flexible production facilities.  
Hence, it may have to depend on receiving adequate advance notice 
on any orders.
The parties would, of course, likely negotiate terms defining 
time parameters for deliveries by the supplier and notice for 
orders by the manufacturer.  The parties might anticipate, however, 
that once the agreement was in effect they would both be willing to 
negotiate around these parameters for the sake of maintaining a 
good and prosperous business relationship.  Suppose, for instance, 
that the manufacturer unexpectedly needed more parts on less 
advance notice than the formal agreement required.  The supplier 
might still be willing to fill the order.  It might have some 
temporary excess capacity and hence not even have to incur any 
additional costs.  Or it might be willing to run its facilities on 
an overtime basis at some additional expense.  Suppose, on the 
other hand, that the supplier was unable to make a timely delivery 
without incurring inordinate costs.  The manufacturer might still 
be willing to waive any applicable penalties.  It might have 
sufficient quantities of the part in stock not to incur any 
inconveniences or costs.  Or it might be willing to transfer 
surplus parts from one plant to another.
Both the manufacturer and the supplier might stand to gain if 
they had an understanding that they would each be willing to make 
cooperative adjustments that were not specifically detailed in the 
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contract.  But their understanding would have to recognize that 
each would place certain limits on its willingness to make such 
adjustments.  Just how far would the supplier be willing to go in 
order to fill an order on short notice?  Would it be willing to 
defer other jobs?  Run four hours of overtime?  Eight hours of 
overtime?  Just how forgiving would the manufacturer be in the 
event of a late delivery?  Would it be willing to run its stocks 
down to precariously low levels?  Would it be willing to transfer 
surplus parts from a plant two hundred miles away?  Two thousand 
miles away?  
As the example suggests, there might be considerably more 
flexibility inherent in the possibilities for reciprocal 
cooperation than a simple prisoner's dilemma game suggests.  In 
general, it might be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
specify all of the details of the cooperative actions routinely 
undertaken under a relational contract, and so many of them would 
likely be left out of any written instrument.  The parties would 
nonetheless enter a relational agreement with certain expectations 
about just how cooperative they would each be.  The analysis above 
suggests that their expectations might well depend on the 
uncertainties -- particularly the strategic uncertainties --
surrounding their transaction.  The parties might reasonably 
anticipate that both they and the other would routinely display 
less cooperation in a more uncertain environment -- that is, one in 
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which unforeseen contingencies were not only more likely, but also 
more likely to encourage opportunism.  Indeed, the analysis 
suggests that they would expect their transaction to be less 
cooperative in a more uncertain environment because high levels of 
reciprocal cooperation would be unsustainable.
Special Arbitration Procedures
An alternative -- or perhaps additional -- way in which the 
parties might address the governance problems is by incorporating 
special arbitration procedures into their agreement.  Scott, for 
instance, suggests that the appointment of a contract referee who 
is authorized to investigate and discover the facts surrounding a 
dispute and then issue a final and binding judgment might be 
particularly effective.71  Indeed, appointing an arbitrator with 
such sweeping powers might help to 1) ensure that an agreement 
would not be disrupted or terminated by unforeseen contingencies, 
and 2) reduce the strategic uncertainties that might otherwise 
inhibit the parties' cooperativeness during the life of their 
agreement.  It would also, however, be quite costly -- though 
perhaps not as costly as civil litigation.  The referee would have 
to be paid some sort of retainer fee, regardless of whether 
circumstances truly requiring her services ever arose.  And there 
71Scott, supra note 7, at 2049.
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would no doubt be additional adjudication costs if her services 
ever were truly required.  
Such arbitration procedures would essentially serve as a 
substitute for judicial intervention.  Although they might allow 
disputes to be adjudicated relatively cheaply compared to the civil 
litigation process, they would not provide the same external 
benefits.  There is a public good dimension to the judicial 
resolution of contractual disputes, particularly if they are of a 
recurring type.72  Legal precedents provide default rules for all 
contracts, and may thus reduce the costs of negotiating and 
drafting any number of agreements.  The benefits of special 
arbitration procedures, on the other hand, derive largely from 
their capacity to reduce the strategic uncertainties surrounding a 
particular relational contract.  None of these benefits spill over 
to other transactions.  If a similar function could be served by a 
contract default rule, such benefits would be available to all 
contracting parties at much lower social costs. 
The Governance Costs of a Relational Contract
The analysis illustrates some of the potentially important 
governance problems associated with a relational contract.  It is 
important to emphasize that these governance problems carry real 
72See Schwartz, supra note 14, at 277.
47
economic costs.  Since special arbitration procedures of the type 
just discussed imply rather direct costs, we will focus on 
governance costs which manifest themselves in the structure of 
relational agreements.  For our purposes, therefore, we may think 
of the governance costs of a relational contract as the difference 
between the joint present discounted profits that would be earned 
in a fully cooperative relational agreement and the joint present 
discounted profits that would be earned in a sustainable but less 
than fully relational agreement.73  Depending on the degree of 
uncertainty inherent in the transaction environment, these could be 
substantial.  Indeed, they might be substantial enough to make some 
alternative to relational contracting desirable, even though a 
relational contract is still feasible.
Indeed, the analysis implies there is a chain of linkages 
between the uncertainty inherent in the transaction environment, 
the parties’ discount rates, and the governance costs of a 
relational contract.  One can infer that as the degree of 
uncertainty and parties’ discount rates rise, the governance costs 
of a relational contract will also rise.  This should make the 
alternatives to relational contracting -- particularly the 
integration of the transaction within an administrative hierarchy -
73These are not true opportunity costs as they do not represent the costs of 
alternatives foregone.  They are nonetheless helpful for thinking about transactional 
problems.
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- relatively more attractive.  There is little, if any, reason to 
believe that the costs of governing a transaction internally would 
be as strongly affected by uncertainty in the environment as the 
costs of governing a transaction at arms length.74  Thus, as the 
degree of uncertainty rises, the relative costs of governing a 
transaction through a relational contract will rise, making 
vertical integration relatively more attractive.  
Most importantly, the analysis also suggests an important 
linkage to the law of contracts.  It implies that any legal 
doctrines that help to reduce the uncertainties surrounding a 
transaction may also help to reduce the governance costs of a 
relational contract.  Legal doctrines may thus have important 
consequences for the manner in which transactions are organized 
more generally.  A transaction will normally only be conducted 
through a relational contract if there is no other mode of 
organization with lower governance costs.  If legal doctrines help 
to lower the governance costs of relational contracts, firms will 
be less likely to organize transactions internally.  At the margin, 
the volume of transactions conducted through relational contracts 
will be greater, and the volume conducted through internal 
74To be more precise, there is no reason to believe the extent of cooperation 
within a vertically integrated organization would decline in the same way that the 
cooperativeness of a relational agreement would decline as the environment became more 
uncertain.
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organization will be smaller.  The legal environment may thus have 
subtle, though important and pervasive, consequences for the way in
which an economy is organized overall. 
Indeed, the analysis suggests that the objective of reducing 
governance costs should be an important criterion in the 
construction of contract laws.  It implies that opportunism 
increases the governance costs of relational contracts.  To the 
extent that legal doctrines are poorly conceived and applied, 
therefore, they will increase the likelihood of opportunistic 
behavior and thus exacerbate governance problems.  To the extent 
that legal doctrines are wisely conceived and applied, they will 
decrease the likelihood of opportunistic behavior and thus help to 
alleviate governance problems.  In this respect, contract law may 
have a significant effect on the governance costs of relational 
agreements in general even if it has only a marginal effect on 
particular parties' propensities to behave opportunistically, since 
the benefits will be felt across a multitude of transactions and 
over a breadth of time.
Of course, sound normative conclusions will recognize that 
legal doctrines may not only serve to impede opportunism, they may 
also be used opportunistically themselves.  Thus, the possibilities 
for opportunistic behavior should be evaluated in conjunction with 
the legal doctrines that might be used to impede them.  And the 
analysis should be conscious of the practical difficulties of 
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interpreting and applying the rules.  Legal doctrines will only 
succeed in diminishing the likelihood of opportunism and reducing 
governance costs if they can be applied in a reasonably clear and
consistent fashion by judges and juries who are themselves 
boundedly rational.
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF IMPRACTICABILITY AND THE GOVERNANCE COSTS OF A 
RELATIONAL CONTRACT
The doctrine of impracticability will reduce the governance 
costs of relational contracts only if it decreases the likelihood 
of opportunistic behavior overall.  In this regard, it is well to 
remember that impracticability is used principally as an 
affirmative defense to a complaint seeking specific performance or 
damages for a breach or an anticipated breach of contract.  Its 
purpose is thus to relieve one of the parties to a contract from 
having to perform its contractual obligations.75  Whether it is used 
to impede opportunism or to impede a legitimate complaint will 
depend as much on the justification for the complaint as on the 
75A court could, of course, go beyond merely deciding whether to excuse 
performances and actually arbitrate the parties' dispute.  Much of the commentary 
concerning the excuse doctrines contemplates this more active form of judicial 
intervention (see Gillette, supra note 7; Scott, supra note 7; Schwartz, supra note 
14).  The analysis here construes the doctrine of impracticability more narrowly.  
Thus, it contemplates the doctrine only as a means of excusing contractual 
performances.
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justification for the excuse.
The basic principles of a relational contract are antithetical 
to legal intervention.  When they enter into a relational contract, 
the parties commit themselves to resolving their own disputes by 
adapting their agreement to unforeseen contingencies as they arise. 
The need for litigation would itself suggest that one of them was 
behaving opportunistically, or at least in violation of the basic 
principles of party autonomy that otherwise defined the nature of 
their agreement.76  There are two basic ways in which a party could 
behave opportunistically: 1) by refusing to agree to an adaptation 
in circumstances which called for one, or 2) by seeking an 
adaptation in circumstances which did not call for one.  
Although the doctrine of impracticability might excuse a party 
from performing its contractual obligations, in theory it need not 
terminate the parties' relationship.  In principle, the other party 
might still be able to induce the excused party's performance, but 
only by renegotiating -- or adapting -- the terms of their 
agreement.  Thus, if a court applies the doctrine of 
impracticability, it effectively forces the parties to negotiate an 
76The parties could, of course, have an honest disagreement about the 
interpretation of the contract.  But it would be very difficult to distinguish an 
honest disagreement about the interpretation of the contract from an opportunistic 
interpretation of the contract.
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adaptation to their agreement instead of enforcing performances.77
Conversely, if a court declines to apply the doctrine, it enforces 
performances instead of forcing the parties to negotiate an 
adaptation to their agreement.  If a court applies the doctrine, 
therefore, it may forestall the first type of opportunism at the 
risk of aiding the second, and if it declines to apply the doctrine 
it may forestall the second kind of opportunism at the risk of 
aiding the first.
For easy reference, we will refer to a court's mistaken 
application of the doctrine as a type I error.  We will refer to a 
court's mistaken failure to apply the doctrine as a type II error.78
In an ideal world, of course, there would be no such thing as 
opportunistic behavior and the probabilities of both types of 
errors would be zero.  But in the world that we inhabit, the 
parties to a contract might not only behave opportunistically, they 
might also attempt to conceal it.  A party might attempt to conceal 
its opportunism, for instance, by taking a bargaining position that 
77This assumes, of course, that they still could negotiate an adaptation of 
their agreement.  In some cases, this might not be true; in others, the parties 
might not be inclined to do so.  The assumption is made primarily to simplify and 
facilitate the discussion.
78This follows Goetz and McChesney's treatment of judicial errors in antitrust 
cases.  See Charles J. Goetz & Fred S. McChesney, Antitrust Law: Interpretation And 
Implementation 67-69 (1998).
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effectively precluded any kind of acceptable adaptation to an 
agreement while at the same time denying that it was refusing to 
adapt, or by claiming that the circumstances called for a 
particular adaptation when it knew they did not.  
The availability of an impracticability defense, therefore, 
would not necessarily reduce the probability of opportunism 
overall.  The change in the probability of opportunism overall 
would equal the probability that the doctrine would prevent 
opportunistic enforcements of contracts minus the probability that 
it would be used opportunistically itself to force adaptations.  If 
the probability that the doctrine would prevent opportunistic 
enforcements was less than the probability that it would be used 
opportunistically itself, then it would actually increase the 
probability of opportunism overall.  In that case, the 
impracticability doctrine might actually increase the governance 
costs of a relational contract.  Of course, one would expect that 
even boundedly rational parties would then attempt to nullify the 
doctrine with an explicit waiver.79  The fact that parties rarely do 
79Some scholars may doubt whether the courts would respect the parties’ 
attempts to waive the impracticability doctrine.  Nonetheless, the language of 
the U.C.C., the commentary of legal scholars, and the case law all suggest that 
the doctrine of impracticability is waivable.  As Norman Prance, Commercial 
Impracticability: A Textual and Economic Analysis of Section 2-615 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 19 Ind. L. Rev. 457, 483 (1986) notes, “A central axiom of 
Article 2 is that the parties are free, within certain limits, to structure their 
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attempt to waive the doctrine suggests that it probably does reduce 
the probability of opportunism overall.
If the doctrine of impracticability does reduce the 
probability of opportunism overall, it probably also generally 
reduces the governance costs associated with relational contracts. 
The economies could take a number of forms: 1) an increase in the 
expected longevity of relational agreements, 2) an increase in the 
cooperativeness of relational agreements, 3) an increase in the 
relationships as they see fit.”  Section 1-102(3) of the U.C.C. provides parties 
wide discretion to vary the terms of sales contracts in general, except where the 
U.C.C. otherwise prohibits, and except where obligations of good faith, 
diligence, reasonableness and care are concerned.  Section 2-615, which states 
the doctrine of impracticability, is prefaced by the words, “Except in so far as 
a seller may have assumed a greater obligation…,” and the exception is clarified 
in comment 8 to mean that “The provisions of this section are made subject to 
assumption of greater liability by agreement…”.  In general, courts have 
interpreted this to mean that the parties to a sales contract may “enlarge upon 
or supplant section 2-615” as they wish (see Eastern Airlines, INC. v. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d. 957, 990 (1976) and Interpetrol Bermuda Ltd. V. Kaiser 
Aluminum Intern., 719 F.2d. 992, 999 (1983).  There is only one case of which the 
author is aware in which a court has ruled on a general waiver of section 2-615; 
in that case, the court held that clauses expressly waiving section 2-615 were 
“valid and enforceable in accordance with their terms.”  Wheelabrator Frackville 
v. Morea Culm Services, Inc., No. 90-2962, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7192, at *81.  
Of course, not all relational contracts would be governed by the U.C.C., but the 
same arguments in favor of respecting the parties’ autonomy would still apply.
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size of the investments made under relational agreements, 4) a 
decrease in expenditures on special arbitration procedures, and 5) 
a decrease in the volume of transactions conducted under less 
efficient governance structures, particularly those involving 
internal organization.
These economies would, of course, only come at the expense of 
the additional legal costs associated with the availability of an 
impracticability defense.  On one view, legal intervention is 
merely a subsidized form of arbitration.  As the foregoing 
discussion noted, however, there is a public good dimension to many 
kinds of legal intervention that often justifies the subsidy.  That 
public good argument would appear to apply very well to the 
doctrine of impracticability.  First of all, the doctrine of 
impracticability is only one possible defense to a complaint 
seeking contractual performance or damages.  There are other 
defenses and the availability of the impracticability defense 
therefore probably has only a marginal impact on litigation costs 
overall.  Second, the doctrine of impracticability potentially 
reduces the governance costs of all relational contracts, 
regardless of whether the parties ever need to use it.
Normative Implications
The analysis suggests that, subject to reasonable legal costs, 
the doctrine of impracticability should be devised so as to 
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minimize the likelihood of opportunism.  To minimize the likelihood 
of opportunism, the doctrine would have to maximize the difference 
between the probability that it would forestall opportunistic 
enforcement and the probability that it would be used opportunistic 
itself.  The probability that the doctrine would forestall 
opportunistic enforcement is inversely related to the probability 
that it would not forestall opportunistic enforcement, which we 
have defined as the probability of a type II error.  Thus, if the 
doctrine was to be devised so as to minimize the likelihood of 
opportunism overall, it would have to minimize the sum of the 
probabilities of type I and type II errors.
The modern doctrine of impracticability has two requirements: 
a foreseeability requirement and an impracticability requirement.  
Consider the impracticability requirement first.  Assume that the 
foreseeability requirement has been appropriately devised.  This 
will allow us to focus all of our attention on the impracticability 
requirement. 
It is not difficult to imagine various ways in which the 
impracticability requirement might be defined.  At one extreme, 
impracticability could be defined so as to require that performance 
be strictly impossible.  The doctrine of impracticability would 
then be equivalent to the doctrine of impossibility as it evolved 
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out of Taylor v. Caldwell.80  In the context of a relational 
contract, it seems very likely that strict impossibility of 
performance would constitute legitimate grounds on which a party 
might seek adjustment.  Since impossibility could probably be 
readily and accurately assessed, both the legal costs and the 
probability of type II errors would likely be very small.  
The probability of type I errors, however, would likely be 
very high.  It is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which 
performances would be physically possible but in which there might 
still be legitimate grounds for an adjustment.  If the 
impracticability test required strict impossibility of performance, 
therefore, it would virtually eliminate type II errors, and 
probably economize on legal costs, but only at the expense of 
causing a high probability of type I errors.  Thus, the doctrine of 
impracticability would rarely, if ever, be exploited for 
opportunistic purposes, but it would also do little to forestall 
opportunistic enforcements.
Consider an impracticability requirement at the other extreme: 
suppose that impracticability merely required the availability of 
some alternative superior to contractual performance (presumably 
one that would yield higher present discounted profits).  If we 
assume that this requirement would also be satisfied by any excuse 
80Taylor v. Caldwell, supra note 2.
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stronger than that (such as strict impossibility) then it is clear 
that it would imply a very low probability of type I errors.  Legal 
costs would also probably be low (it would be almost pointless to 
argue that the party trying to evade performance did not have a 
superior alternative).  But there would likely be many 
circumstances in which parties would seek to evade contractual 
performances opportunistically.  Thus, the probability of type II 
errors would be high.  Under such an expansive interpretation of 
the impracticability requirement, therefore, the doctrine would 
rarely, if ever, allow opportunistic enforcement, but it would 
probably be used opportunistically itself with great frequency.
Finally, consider an impracticability requirement similar to 
that which is commonly employed -- one which requires "severe 
hardship" or "catastrophic consequences."  Under the principles of 
a relational contract, a party would probably be justified in 
seeking adaptations which would ameliorate sufficiently severe 
hardships.  Thus, the probability of type II errors would likely be 
small -- certainly much smaller than under an impracticability 
requirement as expansive as the one described above.  Depending on 
how strictly the severe hardship requirement was interpreted, 
however, there would likely be a significant probability of type I 
errors.  Circumstances far short of severe hardship might well call 
for adaptations.  Nonetheless, the probability of type I errors 
would likely be much smaller than under an impracticability test 
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which required strict impossibility.
It seems reasonable to surmise, therefore, that some version 
of a “severe hardship” impracticability requirement would probably 
achieve the greatest reduction in opportunism overall.  It would 
certainly avoid the high probability of type I errors that would be 
observed under a narrow impracticability requirement and the high 
probability of type II errors that would be observed under an 
expansive impracticability requirement.  It might, however, imply 
relatively high legal costs, particularly if the courts' 
interpretations of "severe hardship" or "catastrophic consequences" 
were unclear or inconsistent.  From a normative perspective, 
therefore, the best impracticability requirement would be one that 
was of an intermediate scope and could be applied clearly and 
consistently.  
Now assume that the impracticability requirement has been 
appropriately devised, and focus on alternative ways in which the 
foreseeability requirement might be defined.  The most expansive 
definition of the foreseeability requirement would make it 
nonexistent.  Thus, the doctrine of impracticability would have 
only an impracticability requirement.  This would almost surely be 
problematic.  It would virtually eliminate the probability of type 
II errors, since excuses would be freely granted, but it would also 
cause the probability of type I errors to be extremely high.  A 
party's invocation of the impracticability doctrine in the face of 
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circumstances that were easily foreseeable would almost always be 
opportunistic.  A foreseeability requirement of some kind would 
thus be necessary to provide the parties with at least minimal 
incentives to foresee impracticability problems and avoid them if 
at all possible.
Consider therefore a "subjective" foreseeability requirement -
- that is, one that simply required a party to show that the 
problematic circumstances were unforeseen, regardless of whether 
they were in any sense unforeseeable.  This would likely cause a 
low probability of type II errors, but, because it would be 
difficult for one party to show that the other did in fact foresee 
a particular set of circumstances, it would also likely cause a 
high probability of type I errors, and would likely result in high 
legal costs.  Indeed, under a subjective foreseeability 
requirement, both parties would actually have an incentive not to 
foresee problematic circumstances.  This might then place them in a 
position to use the impracticability doctrine at some later date.  
Such a use of the doctrine, however, would merely constitute a form 
of planned opportunism.
Finally, consider an "objective" foreseeability requirement --
that is, one that required a party to show that it did not foresee 
the problematic circumstances, and that it was reasonable for the
party not to have foreseen them.  The difficulty of establishing 
the reasonableness of a party's oversights would likely make the 
61
probability of type II errors greater than under a subjective test, 
but not necessarily by a wide margin.  The probability of type I 
errors, on the other hand, would likely be much lower.  There would 
certainly be much less distortion of the parties' incentives to 
foresee impracticability problems, if there was indeed any at all. 
And if an objective test was applied in a reasonably clear and 
consistent fashion, it would likely result in fewer 
impracticability cases going to trial and hence lower litigation 
costs as well.  
It also seems reasonable to surmise, therefore, that an 
objective foreseeability test would help to achieve the greatest 
reduction in opportunism overall.  Of course, an effective test 
would have to be consistent with the cognitive limitations of the 
judges and juries that applied it.  The simpler and clearer the 
criteria upon which the foreseeability test was based, the greater 
the likelihood that it would be clearly and consistently applied.  
Routines, Heuristics, and the Foreseeability Test
The use of routines and heuristics to conceptualize the 
parties' behavior suggests a simple and clear set of criteria upon 
which to base an objective foreseeability test.  If the parties' 
behavior may generally be described in terms of routines and 
heuristics, then the manner in which they generate their 
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expectations during the negotiation stage of an agreement may also 
be described in terms of routines and heuristics.  From a 
behavioral perspective, the parties to a dispute would only have 
been able to foresee particular contingencies if their routines and 
heuristics had allowed them to.  
The reasonableness of a party’s oversights would be a factual 
matter, but not one necessarily requiring any detailed 
investigation of the routines and heuristics that a party actually 
employed.  Rather than investigating the source of a party's 
oversights, the inquiry could focus on 1) determining what kinds of 
routines and heuristics would have been reasonable in the 
circumstances in which the contract was drafted -- eg) what kind of 
personnel should have been assigned to negotiating and drafting the 
agreement, what kind of legal advice should have been sought, 
whether industry experts should have been consulted, and if so, of 
what caliber and experience, etc., and 2) determining whether the 
contingencies would likely have been foreseen if reasonable 
routines and heuristics had been employed -- eg) would sufficiently 
experienced personnel have expected certain types of problems, 
would an industry expert likely have warned the firm about certain 
risks, etc. 
This might seem to come very close to suggesting that standard 
industry practices and customs should be used to establish the 
reasonableness of the parties' oversights.  But that would only be 
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true if the practices and customs were themselves reasonable.  At 
any point in time, standard industry practices and customs might 
lag well behind the "cutting edge" practices of industry leaders or 
firms in other industries -- so far behind that a fact-finder could 
consider them unreasonable.  Indeed, even if there was no lag, a 
fact-finder might still consider them unreasonable merely in light 
of common sense.  Although an objective test based on the parties' 
routines and heuristics would undoubtedly place considerable weight 
on evidence about standard industry practices and customs, it would 
hardly make them dispositive. 
Indeed, this use of routines and heuristics would not be 
inconsistent with the kind of cost-benefit calculations 
characteristic of the conventional law and economics approach.  If 
a marginal expenditure of a few thousand dollars on some readily 
available expert advice might have prevented catastrophic losses in 
a multi-million dollar contract, one might reasonably conclude that 
it should have been incurred.  Of course, a boundedly rational 
party might only have had vague apprehensions about the risks of 
such a catastrophe, and might thus have been unable to contemplate 
the expected marginal benefits with any accuracy, but if the 
discrepancy was sufficiently large, the party’s reasonableness 
might still be brought into doubt.  
In this sense, the courts could themselves use cost-benefit 
calculations as a heuristic device.  Indeed, the use of cost-
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benefit calculations generally depends upon the user having the 
ability to conceive of the alternatives against which the 
calculations might be applied.  The use of routines and heuristics 
to conceptualize the manner in which parties generate their 
expectations would provide the courts with a very practical and 
concrete way of conceiving of the parties' alternatives.  But this 
would not preclude them from using other methods or heuristics to 
reach their conclusions, either.
Modern Applications
This essay does not purport to present a positive theory about 
the doctrine of impracticability.  Indeed, the courts' 
interpretations of the doctrine would seem to defy any kind of 
coherent positive analysis.81  The essay's normative prescriptions 
are nonetheless broadly consistent with the way the doctrine has 
been applied in some important recent cases.  This is significant 
because it implies that the normative prescriptions are at least 
"feasible" in the sense that they could be followed without the 
need for any radical departure from the precedents.
81Schwartz, supra note 14, provides a very general positive analysis that 
purports to identify necessary conditions for judicial intervention and show that they 
are seldom satisfied in relational contexts.
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Eastern Airlines v. Gulf Oil Corp.82
This case originated in a complaint by Eastern seeking to 
enforce Gulf's performance under a long-term contract in which Gulf 
was obligated to supply Eastern with jet fuel.  Gulf responded to 
Eastern's complaint by asserting, among other defenses, that the 
contract was commercially impracticable under the U.C.C. section 
2-615.  The case is especially relevant in view of the longevity of 
the parties' relationship.  Indeed, the court's opinion 
acknowledged that the dispute arose only under "the most recent 
contract between the parties" and involved "the threatened 
disruption of ...[their]... historic relationship,"83 which had 
existed for several decades. 
Gulf's impracticability defense was based on the argument that 
it had not foreseen the "two-tier" pricing scheme that the Federal 
Government imposed on the domestic market for crude oil subsequent 
to the OPEC oil embargo in 1973-74, and that the price controls 
caused such a wide divergence between the price that it had to pay 
for crude oil and the price it received for its fuel under the 
contract's escalator index that its performance became commercially 
impracticable.  The court rejected Gulf's argument, however, both 
on the grounds that it failed to show impracticability and on the 
82Eastern Airlines v. Gulf Oil Corp. 415 F.Supp. 429 (1975).
83Id. at 431.
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grounds that the circumstances that gave rise to the dispute were 
reasonably foreseeable.
The court interpreted the impracticability requirement 
strictly, noting that a "mere showing of unprofitability, without 
more, will not excuse the performance of a contract."84  It also 
appeared to apply an objective version of the foreseeability test, 
noting that "even if Gulf had established great hardship ... [it] 
would not prevail because the events associated with the so-called 
energy crisis were reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract 
was executed."85  Indeed, in support of this finding, the court 
observed that "even those outside the oil industry were aware of 
the possibilities,"86 and provided an illustrative quote from 
Eastern's principal contract negotiator.
Iowa Elec. Light And Power Co. v. Atlas Corp.87
This case originated in a complaint by Iowa Electric (IE) in 
part seeking Atlas's performance of its obligation to supply IE 




87Iowa Elec. Light And Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F.Supp. 129 (1978), 
overruled on jurisdictional grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (1979).
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responded to the complaint by invoking the doctrine of 
impracticability, claiming that unforeseen contingencies had 
resulted in drastic cost increases which should have excused its 
performance and warranted an adjustment of the contract price.  IE 
claimed, however, that the instability in the uranium market was 
one reason it had sought to insure that it would have access to 
uranium supplies at the 1973 price.
Atlas based its impracticability defense on the argument that 
a number of unforeseen circumstances, including the OPEC oil 
embargo, federal environmental and occupational safety regulations, 
inflated factor prices, and unfavorable market conditions, all 
combined to dramatically increase its costs.  The court initially 
rejected Atlas's defense on the grounds that it had "failed to bear 
the burden...to prove which and how much of the increases were 
reasonably unforeseen and not, in part, a function of its own 
actions."88  The court subsequently allowed Atlas to clarify the 
record by submitting more precise cost calculations, but it 
declined to alter its judgment.  Using Atlas's new information, the 
court attributed a 52.2 percent cost increase to circumstances that 
Atlas had not foreseen and that had not been a function of its own 
actions, and estimated Atlas's total loss at about $2,673,125.  It 
ruled, however, that Atlas was not entitled to discharge or 
88Id. at 132-133.
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adjustment as "the absolute losses and percentage of increase do 
not warrant so drastic a remedy."89
The court justified its strict interpretation of the 
impracticability requirement by noting that the "mere fact that 
performance has become economically onerous is not sufficient to 
excuse performance," and that "increases of 50-58 percent generally 
have not been recognized as a basis for excusing or adjusting 
contractual obligations."90  Although the court's final decision did 
not touch on the foreseeability requirement, its initial decision 
had clearly relied on an objective version of the foreseeability 
test.  Indeed, the court found that "prior to the contract being 
signed there was good reason to anticipate rising costs and 
drastically increased expenditures for environmental and safety 
equipment and procedures,"91 and it cited a November 14, 1972 Wall 
Street Journal article which had forecast uranium price increases.
Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc.92




92Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F.Supp. 53 (1980).
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an adjustment of its contract with Essex.  In this regard, the case 
was somewhat unusual and outside the scope of the normative 
prescriptions offered here.  Alcoa's suit was obviously a preferred 
alternative to simply refusing to perform and awaiting a suit by 
Essex.  Under the contract Alcoa was obligated to convert alumina 
supplied by Essex into aluminum, which was then to be conveyed back 
to Essex.  The contract was executed in 1967 and was to run until 
1983, with Essex having the option to extend it to 1988.  Alcoa's 
justifications for the suit were based on a number of common law 
excuse doctrines, including the doctrine of commercial 
impracticability.    
Alcoa's impracticability case was based on the argument that 
unforeseen oil price increases in the wake of the OPEC oil embargo 
and unanticipated pollution control cost increases caused its 
production costs to rise more rapidly than the price it received 
for its aluminum, which was indexed under the contract. Indeed, 
during the period in question, the market price of aluminum rose 
even faster than Alcoa's production costs, and Essex took advantage 
of the discrepancy by reselling millions of pounds of aluminum for 
an enormous profit.  Essex's gains were Alcoa's losses, and the 
court found that without any adjustments to the contract Alcoa 
stood to lose in excess of $75,000,000 (presumably in 1979 or 1980 
dollars).  This prospective loss was the basis for Alcoa's claim 
that its performance would have been impracticable.
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The court ruled that both the foreseeability and the 
impracticability requirements had been met.  Although it 
acknowledged that Alcoa had developed the indexing system, it noted 
that Alcoa had taken the care to examine the way the index 
performed against the past record of aluminum prices and had found 
that its performance fluctuated within a narrow range.  It also 
noted that in constructing the index Alcoa had drawn on the 
expertise of Alan Greenspan, who was then a leading economic 
forecaster and is now, of course, the Chairman of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve.  And on a more general level, the 
court noted that93
Essex and Alcoa are huge industrial 
enterprises.  The management of each is highly 
trained and highly responsible.  The corporate 
officers have access to and use professional 
personnel including lawyers, accountants, 
economists and engineers.  The contract was 
drafted by sophisticated, responsible 
businessmen who were intensely conscious of 
the risks inherent in long-term contracts and 




As far as the impracticability requirement was concerned, the 
court noted that the standard had evolved from one of impossibility 
of performance to one that "denotes an impediment to performance 
lying between impossibility and impracticability"94 in the common 
sense of the word.  It ruled that the increase in Alcoa's costs was 
severe enough to warrant relief under such a standard.  The court 
found that, even based on conservative predictions, Alcoa stood to 
lose at least $60,000,000 over the life of the contract (again, 
presumably in 1979 or 1980 dollars).  Although it did not discuss 
Essex's ethical position in the dispute, the court did note that 
"[the] margin of profit shows the tremendous advantage which Essex 
enjoys under the contract" and that "[a] significant fraction of 
Essex's advantage is directly attributable to the corresponding 
...losses Alcoa suffers."95  This might be interpreted as an 
insinuation that Essex was behaving opportunistically.
Some Final Observations
These cases are at least broadly consistent with the normative 
prescriptions that have been offered in this essay.  One reason the 
court rejected Gulf's impracticability defense in Eastern v. Gulf
was that the oil price increases which Gulf argued were 




The clear implication is that Gulf's own contract negotiators 
should have been able to foresee the risks.  In Iowa Electric v. 
Atlas the court pointed to direct evidence that at least some of 
Atlas's cost increases should have been foreseen.  And in Alcoa v. 
Essex the court accepted Alcoa's impracticability argument on the 
grounds that Alcoa had used sophisticated personnel and a highly 
esteemed forecaster to construct the price index for its aluminum. 
The court thus ruled that the failure of the price index was 
reasonably unforeseen on the basis of the practices that Alcoa had 
used in the process of negotiating and drafting the contract.  
The courts also interpreted the impracticability requirement 
strictly in all three cases, though not strictly enough as to all 
but deny excuse in any case in which performance was still 
physically possible.  Although the court's decision was not based 
on the impracticability test in Eastern v. Gulf, the court did 
indicate that impracticability required a showing of something more 
than mere unprofitability.  And in Iowa Electric v. Atlas the court 
denied Atlas relief on the grounds that cost increases of 50-58 
percent and losses of $2,673,125 were not severe enough to meet the 
impracticability requirement.  Indeed, the impracticability 
requirement was met only in Alcoa v. Essex -- and only there on the 
basis of projected losses of at least $60,000,000. 
Of the three cases, Alcoa has probably been the subject of the 
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most commentary, and much of it has been critical.96  In Alcoa the 
court chose to modify the contract instead of simply excusing 
Alcoa's performance.  In so doing it went beyond the normative 
prescriptions offered here.  The analysis here only justifies the 
use of the impracticability doctrine to excuse a party's 
performance, not to modify a contract.  The purpose of allowing the 
courts to excuse performances is to forestall opportunism and at 
the same time encourage the parties to adjust their performances 
autonomously through bilateral negotiations.  On this reasoning, if 
Essex had known that Alcoa's performance would be excused, the 
parties probably would have been able to adapt their agreement 
without any legal intervention.  Indeed, it is interesting to note 
that Alcoa and Essex actually negotiated a modification of their 
agreement contingent on Alcoa being excused before the court 
reached its verdict.  The court's remedy only partially implemented 
their proposed modification.
All of these cases involved contracts that could be construed 
as "relational" in the sense defined here.  It is not clear, 
however, that any of them involved particularly high governance 
costs.  The analysis here implies that the governance costs of a 
relational contract will be particularly high only in highly 
96Schwartz, supra note 14, at 293-94, for instance, describes the case as 
"unsatisfactory" and claims the opinion has not been followed.  See also Scott, supra
note 7, at 2051; Sykes, supra note 10, at 83.
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uncertain environments.  It is not clear whether the environments 
in which the transactions at the center of these cases were 
conducted were sufficiently uncertain to cause particularly high 
governance costs.  That is irrelevant, however, to the benefits 
that might be derived from the appropriate application of the 
impracticability doctrine.  The point of the analysis is not that 
the appropriate application of the doctrine in any particular 
contractual dispute will reduce the governance costs associated 
with that contract.  Rather, it is that the appropriate application 
of the doctrine in general will minimize the risks of opportunism 
and reduce the strategic uncertainties associated with relational 
contracts overall.  This will reduce the governance costs of all 
relational contracts, especially those in which governance problems 
are severe.
V. AN OVERVIEW OF SOME OF THE ETHICAL ISSUES
The law of contracts lies at the heart of capitalist economic 
institutions.  It is thus intimately connected to the broader moral 
values that both help to define and to sustain our entire social 
and economic system.  But since it also regulates the conduct of 
individual transactions, it is equally important to the moral 
character of our day-to-day affairs.  Unfortunately, there is no 
theoretical framework broad enough to encompass both the economic 
and the ethical dimensions of contracting problems, even though 
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they are interlocking pieces of the same puzzle.97  This essay has 
approached relational contracting problems from primarily an 
economic perspective, and it has suggested that the doctrine of 
impracticability may serve a particular economic purpose.  It would 
be instructive, therefore, to contemplate whether the normative 
prescriptions might conflict with any of the moral values imbedded 
97This is in some ways ironic, because economics has deep roots in moral 
philosophy.  Indeed, Adam Smith, who is usually considered the first professional 
economist, was actually a professor of moral philosophy and may rightly be 
considered as much of a philosopher as an economist.  See Patricia H. Werhane, 
Adam Smith And His Legacy For Modern Capitalism (1991) for a study of Adam Smith 
as a moral philosopher.  At some point, most professional economists became 
predominantly interested in a social scientific approach to economic phenomena 
and economics largely lost its connections to moral philosophy.  The economics 
profession has, however, recently shown renewed interest in the ethical 
dimensions of economic problems.  Indeed, in a classic essay, Amartya Sen has 
made a compelling argument that the rationality assumptions of the conventional 
economic approach are inconsistent with the kind of moral choices that people 
commonly make, and hence that some broader conception of human motivation, which 
incorporates a role for moral deliberation, is essential to coherent theorizing 
(see Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of 
Economic Theory, in Sen, Choice, Welfare and Measurement 84 (1982)).  
Unfortunately, there is as yet no general theoretical framework which embodies 
both peoples' economic and ethical motivations.  For a useful survey of 
scholarship that explores the connections between ethics and economics, see 
Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson, Taking Rights Seriously: Economics and 
Contemporary Moral Philosophy, 31 J. Econ. Lit. 671 (1993). 
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in the contract laws.
It is only appropriate, however, to begin by making some 
disclaimers.  The discussion here does not attempt to understand 
relational contracting or the impracticability doctrine from the 
perspectives of contemporary moral theories.  Its more limited 
purpose is to address some of the practical moral and ethical 
concerns that have been raised, or might be raised, by those who 
have studied relational contracting problems and the doctrine of 
impracticability.  
Any analysis of ethical issues must surmount a number of 
difficulties.  For one thing, it is very difficult to define 
precisely what our moral values are, and to distinguish them from 
the moral values held by people in other societies and cultures.98
Indeed, it is not even clear whether our moral values are always 
consistent.99  In a given set of circumstances, for instance, the 
98One survey study of American and Soviet attitudes towards free markets, for 
instance, found that American and Soviet respondents were "basically similar in some 
very important dimensions: in their attitudes toward fairness, income inequality, and 
incentives and in their understanding of the working of markets."  Robert J. Shiller, 
et al., Popular Attitudes Toward Free Markets: The Soviet Union and the United States 
Compared, 81 Amer. Econ. Rev. 385, 385 (1991).
99This creates the potential for moral dilemmas.  See Joanne B. Ciulla, Business 
Ethics as Moral Imagination, in R. Edward Freeman, ed., Business Ethics: The State Of 
The Art (1991).  Ciulla argues that moral dilemmas may be addressed only by 
cultivating the moral imagination.  Regardless of whether this is true, they will 
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value that we place on the principle of desert might well clash 
with the value that we place on distributional equity.  Moreover, 
ethical issues are highly emotive, and our ethical assessments of 
certain outcomes may be based as much on inarticulable feelings as 
on conscious deliberations.100  Finally, our ethical judgments may 
be "situational" -- that is, they may be deeply rooted in the 
circumstances of individual cases and thus resist generalization.101
All of these difficulties, and no doubt others as well, impede 
our capacities for moral analysis.  But the last is particularly 
germane to relational contracting problems.  Relational contracting 
is a relatively recent development in the evolution of contract 
law.  The moral and ethical values that sustain the classical 
contracting paradigm may provide an inappropriate basis for an 
ethical assessment of the role that legal doctrines play in 
relational contracts.  It is especially important, therefore, to 
clearly not be easily susceptible to analytic treatments.
100Robert Solomon, for instance, argues that emotions have a natural and central 
place in all moral judgments.  See Robert C. Solomon, A Passion For Justice: Emotions 
and the Origins of the Social Contract (1990).
101See Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics: The New Morality (1966) for the 
classic argument.  See Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Ethical Imperatives and Corporate 
Leadership in R. Edward Freeman, Business Ethics: The State of The Art (1991) for an 
argument that a corporation's managers must understand the specific circumstances in 
which its employees must act if it is to improve upon its ethical standards.
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approach relational contracting problems with their unique 
character and circumstances clearly in mind.  These may not only 
require fresh ethical perspectives on established legal doctrines, 
they may also require that we reconsider some of the broader moral 
values that lie at the very heart of contract law.
The conceptualization of relational contracting problems in 
this essay has implied a set of circumstances with distinctive 
ethical overtones.  The parties' inclinations to behave 
opportunistically reflect ethical shortcomings that may impede 
their abilities to cooperate, in spite of the potential mutual 
gains.  The role that has been prescribed for the doctrine of 
impracticability is to forestall such opportunism and thus help to 
alleviate the costs that would otherwise result from these ethical 
shortcomings.  Some of the ethical implications of the analysis are 
thus deeply imbedded in the conceptualization of the circumstances. 
Indeed, in that respect the analysis suggests that the 
impracticability doctrine may serve as a substitute for good 
business ethics.  On the other hand, it also suggests that good 
business ethics might yield significant economic benefits.
Contract as a Form of Individual Expression
Classical contract analysis and neoclassical economics both 
reflect the great value that has traditionally been placed on the 
principles of economic liberty and voluntary exchange.  They are 
intimately connected to the notion that the freedom to contract is 
79
an inviolable form of self-expression and the common moral 
disapprobation for those who seek to be excused from the 
performance of obligations that were voluntarily incurred.  Under a 
theory of contract as a "mechanism for autonomous individual 
expression,"102 a "contract's moral force derives from the fact of 
its voluntary agreement; when I enter freely into an agreement, I 
am bound by its terms, whatever they may be."103  The classical 
conception of contracts is therefore inherently antagonistic 
towards the idea of contractual excuse.  Indeed, those who 
subscribe to the classical model tend to view relational contracts 
as a subspecies of contracts somewhere within the "more nebulous 
realm of fiduciary relations."104
That may, indeed, be true, but it is not at all clear that 
relational contracting practices will undermine the principles of 
economic liberty and voluntary exchange, or that they are 
inconsistent with the notion of contract as a form of individual 
expression, even if, as has been proposed here, they allow for the 
possibility of contractual excuse.  The decision to enter into a 
relational contract is made freely and voluntarily, and there is no 
102Gillette, supra note 7, at 571.
103M. Sandel, Liberalism And The Limits Of Justice 105-113 (1982) quoted in 
Gillette, supra note 7, at 571.
104Gillette, supra note 7, at 571.
80
reason why that decision cannot itself be interpreted as a form of 
individual expression.  On that view, the parties to a relational 
contract commit themselves to an agreement in which they may have 
both a right and an obligation to adapt their performances in the 
face of new circumstances.  Once they have voluntarily made such an 
agreement, they should be bound by its terms, including those 
requiring adaptations, no less than they would be in a classical 
contract.  The doctrine of impracticability would simply force them 
to honor their commitments in circumstances that might otherwise 
induce them to behave opportunistically.
From this perspective, relational contracts serve to expand 
the range of economic liberties and the freedom to engage in 
voluntary exchange.  It hardly matters whether they more closely 
resemble fiduciary relationships or classical contracts.  The 
important point is that they probably allow for a wider variety of 
individual expressions than partnerships and classical contracts 
would in their absence.  Moreover, the parties' commitments are no 
less binding than those made under other contract forms; they are 
simply somewhat different.  And though it might appear that the 
doctrine of impracticability would allow the courts to intervene in 
an otherwise autonomous relationship, it should be remembered that 
the doctrine is basically a defense to a complaint seeking specific 
performance.  When a court applies the doctrine, therefore, at 
least as it has been prescribed here, and declines to enforce 
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performances, it forces the parties to resolve their dispute 
themselves, and thus interferes with their autonomy no more than it 
would have if it had enforced their performances.
Indeed, the doctrine of impracticability is merely a default 
rule.  It is not immutable, like the duty to act in good faith, and 
so there is no reason why parties could not simply nullify it with 
an explicit contractual waiver.  When parties enter into a contract 
without waiving it, therefore, they implicitly express their 
intentions to be bound by its terms.105  This is especially true of 
the kind of relational contracts that have been discussed here.  
These are generally executed by large corporate entities that are 
managed by sophisticated and experienced business personnel and 
have direct access to considerable legal and economic expertise.  
Although there are no doubt limits on their rationality, they must 
105See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual 
Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821, 864-5 (1982) for an articulation of a consent theory 
in which the parties manifest an intention to be legally bound by contract 
default rules simply by invoking the system of legal enforcement.  The consent 
theory is fully consistent with the conventional law and economics view, and has 
been used in a number of important law and economics studies – see Ian Ayres and 
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 98 Yale L.J. 87 (1989); Jason Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and 
the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 Yale L. J. 615 (1990); Ian 
Ayres and Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal 
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L.J. 729 (1992).
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understand the legal consequences of executing a contract without 
waiving the doctrine of impracticability, and they must also 
understand in principle how easily such a rule could be waived.  
The fact that they do not attempt to waive it can only be 
interpreted as an expression of their intentions.
The Internal Norms and Ethics of a Relational Contract
A relational contract tends to generate its own internal norms 
and ethics.106  Indeed, these may well be essential to its success. 
According to Scott, for instance, the norms of behavior and 
interpersonal ethics that develop between the employees of 
transacting corporations can "help to solidify the relationship and 
permit it to survive the myopia of individual decisionmakers."107
These may thus serve as an alternative means of reducing the 
strategic uncertainties otherwise inherent in a relational 
agreement.  Indeed, Scott conceives of excuse doctrines largely as 
substitutes for extralegal means of control.108  We should, 
therefore, consider the possibility that active use of the 
impracticability doctrine would simply impede the development of 
the internal norms and ethics that might otherwise serve a similar 
106See the discussion in Scott, supra note 7, at 2040-2042.
107Id. at 2042. 
108Id. at 2051. 
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function, but perhaps serve it better.
On this matter, however, our analysis must remain speculative. 
The theoretical framework of this essay assumes that the doctrine 
of impracticability may have a useful role in forestalling 
opportunism.  Thus it implicitly assumes that any adverse effects 
the doctrine would have on the internal norms and ethics of a 
relational contract would be more than offset by its own benefits. 
A truly rigorous assessment of the issue could only be undertaken 
in a framework that was flexible enough to incorporate the internal 
norms and ethics explicitly into its analysis.  As the foregoing 
discussion indicates, there is as yet no such framework.  There 
are, however, good reasons to doubt whether the "interplay between 
legal and extralegal methods”109 of control argues against the 
normative prescriptions for the doctrine of impracticability that 
have been suggested here.
For one thing, the vast majority of laws are probably 
complements rather than substitutes to the moral and ethical values 
that also serve to inhibit dysfunctional behavior.  Most criminal 
laws, for instance, almost certainly complement the moral 
proscriptions that inhibit most people from engaging in criminal 
acts.  One never hears politicians proclaiming that they will 
repeal the criminal laws to reduce the crime rate.  Of course, 
contract laws address very different kinds of behavior and may 
109Id.
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therefore interact with our moral and ethical values in a 
completely different way.  But other contract doctrines, such as 
the duty to act in good faith, seem to embrace ethical principles, 
and we do not worry whether they will in any way diminish the 
ethical standards that also might help to encourage desirable 
behavior.  There is little reason to believe that the doctrine of 
impracticability is not also a complement rather than a substitute 
for the internal norms and ethics that otherwise serve to forestall 
opportunism under a relational contract.
Moreover, it bears repeating that the doctrine of 
impracticability is only a default rule.  On this view, if the 
parties felt that it would impede the internal norms and ethics of 
their relationship, they could simply contract around it.  The 
doctrine would then generally only apply when any adverse effects 
it was expected to have on the relationship would be more than 
offset by its expected benefits.  If the parties could be relied 
upon to make such assessments wisely, then the availability of the 
doctrine as a default rule would still minimize the incidence of 
opportunism overall.  Of course, since the parties are boundedly 
rational they might not always make those assessments wisely, and 
so the doctrine might apply to some contracts in which it was 
detrimental.  But one would expect that the accumulation of 
commercial experience and wisdom would probably soon lead to the 
doctrine being waived as a matter of standard business practice.
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Excuse and Fairness
From an ethical perspective, the "fairness" of the outcome 
should be an important goal in the adjudication of any contractual 
dispute.  It is important to consider, therefore, whether the 
doctrine of impracticability is consistent with the delicate 
balance between the principles of distributional equity and desert 
that seems to comprise our notion of "fairness."  Not all legal 
scholars would agree that it is, even if they accept the 
proposition that the parties to a contract are boundedly rational. 
As Gillette puts it,110
The bounded rationality model assumes actors 
engage in a rational decision-making process 
that satisfies their concerns for subsequent 
intervening events, despite their inability to 
make precise probabilistic calculations.  
Thus, an actor who has rationally determined 
to exclude a specific risk, or not to consider 
further the possibility of an intervening 
event, is not simply an innocent victim of 
circumstances....An actor that has reasoned 
that additional investments in discovery and 
consideration of risks are not worth the 
110Gillette, supra note 7, at 581.
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effort seems to deserve the consequences of 
that decision.
According to Gillette, therefore, the party that is 
"disadvantaged" by some unforeseen contingency deserves the loss.111
But it is not clear that Gillette's argument applies to parties who 
form relational contracts as they have been conceived here.  As 
they have been conceived here, relational contracts provide a means 
of coping with unforeseen contingencies as they arise, rather than 
attempting to plan for them in advance.  Thus, when parties form a 
relational contract they do so with the understanding that their 
agreement will be adapted to new circumstances and unique 
situations as they unfold.  This is corroborated by the fact that 
they rarely, if ever, contract around the doctrine of 
impracticability.  It seems clear, therefore, that they do not 
intend the consequences of their decisions to be to have to 
passively accept their losses in the event of some catastrophic 
unforeseen contingency.  There is thus no reason why the courts 
should force them to accept such losses by enforcing their 
performances.
This essay has presented an analytical framework in which the 
doctrine of impracticability derives its usefulness from its 
capacity to reduce the governance costs of relational contracts by 
reducing the strategic uncertainties associated with parties' 
111Id. at 582.
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propensities to behave opportunistically.  The term "opportunism" 
obviously has connotations of unethical behavior.  There is no 
sense in which the gains that a party earns from behaving 
opportunistically are deserved.  In fact, we would normally think 
such opportunism inconsistent with the principles of honesty and 
fair dealing that provide the bedrock for good business ethics.  To 
the extent that the doctrine of impracticability serves to 
forestall opportunism, therefore, it might also help to raise the 
ethical standards of parties' business dealings.  Indeed, since 
good business ethics may well be good for business in general,112
the doctrine might yield economic benefits beyond those suggested 
by the analytical framework alone.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This essay has analyzed the doctrine of impracticability from 
a behavioral economics perspective.  It has attempted to show that 
the doctrine may reduce the governance costs of relational 
contracts by curbing parties' propensities to behave 
opportunistically.  To that end, the analysis suggests that the 
doctrine should employ a severe hardship criterion for the 
impracticability test and an objective foreseeability test.  To the 
112This is certainly the view of most business ethicists.  See, for instance, 
Robert Solomon, Ethics and Excellence: Cooperation and Integrity in Business 
(1992).
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extent the doctrine does reduce the likelihood of opportunism 
overall, it will 1) increase the longevity of relational contracts, 
2) improve the cooperativeness of relational contracts, 3) increase 
the size of investments under relational contracts, 4) decrease 
expenditures on special arbitration procedures, and 5) decrease the 
volume of the transactions conducted under less efficient 
governance structures, in particular, administrative hierarchies.  
All of these would yield direct economic benefits.  There might be 
other benefits as well, though these are beyond the scope of the 
analysis.  
The normative prescriptions are meant to be tentative and 
provocative.  Further research on relational contracting practices 
and the legal doctrines that apply to them will undoubtedly prove 
of great value.  This essay does not present any empirical evidence 
in support of its analytic results.  That does not, however, mean 
that it is completely without any empirical basis.  The analysis is 
vested in a theoretical framework that has been applied with great 
success in a number of empirical studies and has been employed to 
clarify and communicate important transitions in the history of the 
modern business corporation.113  Thus, the analytic results cohere 
with a large and systematic body of empirical evidence.  
Nonetheless, further empirical research may prove particularly 
valuable.  Empirical studies that attempt to probe the 
113See Shelanski & Klein, supra note 62; Chandler, supra note 63.
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interconnections between legal doctrines and the microanalytics of 
individual transactions may prove especially insightful.  This 
suggests a challenging research agenda, but one that promises great 
rewards.
